
Two Denials, Two Approaches to Due Process at Wisconsin’s Equal Rights Division
Outpost 422 | Opinion by Bradley J. Burt
Two Wisconsin Equal Rights Division administrative law judges denied motions I filed. Stephanie M. Brown denied my request to compel fuller discovery responses from Marcus Palace Cinema. John C. Carlson Jr. denied my request to lift a stay in my Frank Productions case. I was the complainant in both cases. Reading the two rulings side by side, I find Brown’s letter more persuasive as an example of how an adjudicator can show both sides that their arguments were heard.
Brown showed how she reached her decision
Brown’s March 4 letter set out my objection that Marcus had given evasive or incomplete responses and the company’s position that it had answered the questions it could. She then worked through the individual interrogatories. For the question Marcus declined to answer, she explained that asking whether managers had failed to forward employee complaints to HR swept broadly and left unclear how the answer would bear on my allegations. That gives me a concrete reason to examine and, if warranted, challenge.
I still see a gap in her reasoning. Interrogatory No. 5 asked whether I communicated with managers or supervisors about a Division of Vocational Rehabilitation employment plan. Marcus answered that it had no record of an email or other written communication seeking acknowledgment, recognition, or implementation of the plan. Brown treated that as sufficient. Her letter leaves open why an answer confined to written communications addressed a question broad enough to include a conversation. The specificity of her letter makes that gap visible.¹
Carlson had a practical reason to wait
Carlson’s October 28 order explained why the ERD could wait for an initial determination in a related Frank Productions case. Both complaints substantially concerned the same termination and the events leading up to it. Waiting preserved the option of one consolidated hearing if circumstances warranted. His earlier order had denied the employer’s consolidation motion as premature, and mediation remained available by mutual agreement. He also relied on a Labor and Industry Review Commission decision to explain why a fresh probable-cause hearing, where both parties can offer relevant evidence, was the procedural route for addressing the alleged investigative defects.²
That answers why the judge saw a new investigation as unnecessary. I wanted a fuller answer to a different question. Why should the hearing itself wait? Carlson identified the overlap and the event that would end the stay once he was notified. The order set no calendar date or status review if the related investigation took longer than expected. It also characterized my submissions as “prolix, tangential, and often irrelevant.” That description would have been more informative if the order had identified which points in my request to lift the stay fell outside the issue and why. Agreeing with the employer’s procedural argument can be entirely appropriate. The written order is where readers should be able to see how the judge independently answered the strongest argument for proceeding sooner.²
What these rulings tell me about fitness
Due process requires an impartial decision-maker in administrative adjudication. In Withrow v. Larkin, the U.S. Supreme Court began with a presumption of honesty and integrity and asked whether the circumstances created a constitutionally intolerable risk of bias. Wisconsin’s Supreme Court likewise recognized a fair and impartial decision-maker as fundamental to due process. An adverse result, sharp language, or agreement with one party’s argument, without more, supplies too little to conclude that either judge was constitutionally disqualified.³
My judgment is narrower. On these two records, Brown better demonstrated the kind of transparent reasoning I want from an ERD administrative law judge. The motions involved different duties, so the comparison turns on how each judge explained the exercise of discretion. Brown gave me enough detail to identify both the rationale and a possible weakness. Carlson gave a legitimate reason for coordinating the cases, and his explanation would have carried more weight with me had he addressed the cost of waiting and explained when the ERD would revisit that choice if the investigation stalled.
Both parties have an interest in avoiding duplicative proceedings. Both also have an interest in knowing when they can present evidence. A status date and a short explanation of what would justify revisiting a stay would serve both interests. I can accept a ruling against me. I want to be able to read it and understand why my strongest argument did not carry the day.
Sources
- Letter from Stephanie M. Brown, Admin. L. Judge, Wis. Equal Rts. Div., to Bradley Burt and Joshua Welsh, Bradley Burt v. Marcus Palace Cinema, ERD Case No. CR202303238, at 1–3 (Mar. 4, 2026).
- Decision and Order Denying Complainant’s Motions to Remove Case from Abeyance and for Other Relief, Bradley J. Burt v. Frank Productions, LLC, ERD Case No. CR202500211, at 1–4 (Wis. Equal Rts. Div. Oct. 28, 2026).
- Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46–47, 58 (1975). Guthrie v. Wis. Emp. Rels. Comm’n, 111 Wis. 2d 447, 454, 331 N.W.2d 331 (1983).